The very word "Kosovo"
has opposing meanings in different ethnic communities in this part of southwest
Balkans. For Serbs, the very meaning of Kosovo signifies above all a genuine
Serbian land, the sacred territory of the "Serbian Jerusalem" whose
glorious cultural and economic rise in the middle ages was brutally cut off from
its European and Christian background by the Ottoman conquests. The suffering of
Kosovo, heralded by the famous battle of 1389, became a reality for the majority
of Serbian people by the mid-fifteenth century following final Ottoman victories.
After long centuries of Ottoman rule, after the First Balkan War in 1912 Kosovo,
under international settlement at London Conference (1913) became again a part
of Serbia, while Metohija (now called by Albanians a "western Kosovo")
was absorbed by Montenegro, another Serbian kingdom.(1)
For the average Serb
yesterday and today the word Kosovo means
In Serbian language the
word Kosovo coupled with word Metohija (metoch in Greek means a church property),
is the official name of the territory of the southern province of Serbia,
covered with 1300 churches and monasteries scattered all over this area. However,
from 1968 the word Metohija at the demands of Kosovo Albanian communist
leadership has been banned for official political communication, only to be
reinstated in 1990. Kosovo is by all means symbolically the most important word
in Serbian historical dictionary that, after the name of Savior, and Saint Sava
(the founder of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the early thirteenth century),
denotes simultaneously both the national and cultural identity of the whole
Serbian people. The Kosovo tradition grew during the centuries of Ottoman rule,
primarily due to the aegis of the Pec Patriarchate (1557-1766), and with time it
coalesced with the popular tradition and became the axis of modern ethnic
identity in the era of nationalism. The popular tradition, inspired with basic
Christian values, in the form of the Kosovo oath (the oath that full freedom is
won only with the definite liberation of Kosovo) was a political maxim on which
the modern national ideology was built.(3) During the period of national
romanticism in the nineteenth century, in all Serbian lands - but most of all in
Montenegro during the rule of Bishop Petar II Petrovic Njegos (1830-1851) - the
word Kosovo both with the God's name, was the expression most commonly used in
everyday communication, as a proof of the living past overshadowing every aspect
of the ordinary life, not only as a reminder of an onerous heritage but also as
a definition of present political priorities.
At the promotion of the
book Crucified Kosovo, held on September 15
For ethnic Albanians the
word Kosovo (or Kosova in the Albanian pronunciation) is considered as a symbol
of "ancient Albanian land" which directly connects the ancient
Illyrian and modern Albanian ethnic community in this territory. This is a
typical case of "inventing the tradition" (E. Hobsbawm) having little
in common with established historical facts. In more recent times Kosova is for
Albanians a symbol of Diaspora- type of nationalism which feeds on constant
demographic expansion as a form of ethnic legitimization of pretensions on
certain highly disputed territory. The Diaspora-type of nationalism is, also in
Kosovo Albanian case, closely tied to the control over disputed territory in
order to establish a new national identity and. Diaspora-type nationalism fits
in harmoniously with the social motivation of poor highlanders from northern
Albania who have been flooding for centuries into the fertile flatlands of
neighboring countries.(5) The fact is that there is no scholarly proof of
continuity between the Illyrians and present-day Albanians. This gap, unyielding
void in the historical records from the sixth to the eleventh century, did not
have any significant effect on the national mythology, on the establishment of
the Illyrian myth as a constituent part of the Albanian national identity.
Regarding Kosovo (as an allegedly Illyrian-Albanian territory) a double approach
was applied: on the one hand the Illyrian-Albanian continuity (via the tribes of
Dardanians) was proved, and on the other hand there were systematic attempts to
"unmask Serbian myths" about Kosovo.(6)
Due to the ideological
projection constructed both by the national romantic and state controlled
Albanian historiography during the twentieth century, Kosovo gradually became a
symbol of "occupied ethnic territory" for the local Albanians. In the
"scientific" interpretation of Albanian historians, the Serbian
monasteries, erected in an extraordinarily large number in the period from
twelfth to fifteenth century, were frequently built on the older foundations of
"Illyrian" (but, in fact, Byzantine) churches by "occupying"
Serbian rulers, kings and princes of the Nemanjic dynasty.(7)
However, the scholarly
confirmed and verifiable facts showed that, besides monumental endowments
erected by Serbian rulers and Church dignitaries during the Middle Ages,
numerous smaller Orthodox churches and monasteries were built by several dozens
of local Serbian lords. They were usually a native nobility, land-owners, born
in Kosovo, while the most of the names of villages (granted by Serbian rulers to
Orthodox churches and monasteries) were most often Slav.(8) All that, however,
was not considered as scientific argument for the Albanian romantic-oriented
national history, a history which glosses over the gaps and retroactively
establishes "historical continuity", according to Enver Hohxa's
official ideological concept of Albanian history.(9)
Hence, in the second half
of 1999, under the full military and political rule of KFOR and UNMIK, such a
great efforts by Albanians to destroy and obliterate in a quick, systematic
action all the Serbian monasteries and churches in ethnically cleansed areas -
is the attempt to erase all traces of past and present Serbian existence in
Kosovo-Metohija. Even the most significant medieval churches and monasteries,
constantly guarded by KFOR (The Pec Patriarchate, Monastery of Visoki Decani) in
presently ethnically cleansed of Serbs, only Albanian-inhabited regions, are
often shelled from surrounding hills by KLA forces or simply by local groups of
armed ethnic Albanians. In contrast, the visible absence of a larger number of
Albanian historical sites compared with the overwhelming presence of Serbian
monuments ultimately demands the destruction of the latter so that a new reality
can be justified to the local Albanians and their descendants- Kosovo as
exclusively Albanian land.
In western media, the
understanding of Kosovo is far closer to the Albanian interpretation. There is
even an acceptance based hopefully on ignorance, of the non-scientific theses of
Albanian national romanticism. An typical approach is searching for balanced
view between the two totally contradictory interpretations: although a good
methodology, the choice of wrong or uneven references, between the Serbian side
(which, still, most often relies on reliable scholarly knowledge) and Albanian
interpretation (which is, as a rule, as far as the past is concerned, radical
and contrary to scientifically verifiable facts). A mathematical choice, usually
between moderate Serbian and nationalist Albanian) an only somewhat modified
Albanian version of historical events.(10)
This approach is
facilitated with a following pattern. Everything that is in conflict with
Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian dictator, the famous "Butcher of the
Balkans", automatically becomes legitimate. Therefore from the Western
perspective, the usual pattern is a simplified, mainly black and white
historical interpretations of Kosovo history, including pre-Milosevic periods..
This interpretations were adapted to the prevailing Western discourse in
official political approach, and were usually accepted without any serious
discussion among the scholars. Here, however, one should not overlook the
readiness of certain western 'experts' to offer their 'scientific' skills in
geopolitics, geography and history to prepare the wider public for the upcoming
redefinition of the composition and character of a certain region, which,
implicitly predetermines its political future.(11) A book by Noel Malcolm,
Kosovo: A Short History is a paradigmatic example of the newly created,
politically correct" history. Malcolm, although clearly biased in his
approach, has produced a westernized version political-nationalist mythology
which "scientifically justifies" that Kosovo was through the centuries
an essentially Albanian land occupied by the Serbs, and that it will be "liberated"
in the immediate future.(12) Other more balances analysis from Western scholars
were not, as needed in Kosovo, being taken into consideration.(13)
The modern Western
understanding of Kosovo is simple: it is considered to be a predominantly
Albanian land (with about 90 percent of ethnic Albanians) which has been
suffering for ten year under the rule of the Serbian minority, under the "Serbian
apartheid" of Slobodan Milosevic and his regime, since 1989. The additional
confusion was created with the usage of the western concept of nation which (following
the model nation-state or l'Etat-Nation) is much closer to the concept of "Kosovo
people", suggesting the existence of a distinct Kosovo nation. Although,
such a separate nation does not exist but only peoples (in plural) of Kosovo,
among whom Serbs and ethnic Albanians are the most distinct ethnic communities.
Under a Kosovo people the Albanian political propaganda implies, however, only
ethnic Albanians (others are by acquiescence reduced to a minority status),
justifying it with an incorrect data stating that Albanians constitute at least
90 percent of the overall population in this southern province of the Republic
of Serbia.(14)
That there is no single
Kosovo people nor Kosovo nation (as distinct from the one in
Milosevic and the
long-standing leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova had a
kind of tacit, mutually respected agreement: Serbian president Slobodan
Milosevic let self-proclaimed Kosovo-Albanian president Ibrahim Rugova to
organize a parallel educational, economic, health-care and tax system. It was a
system from which the local Serbian government in Kosovo took only a small cut.
In return, ethnic Albanians persistently boycotted multi-party elections in
Serbia and thus allowed Slobodan Milosevic to win, with about a hundred thousand
Serbian and other minorities' votes, at least thirty parliamentary seats in the
National Assembly of Serbia.(17) This mandates from Kosovo enabled him to went
on ruling the whole of Serbia even after 1992 when his Socialist party (SPS)
together with their coalition partners de facto lost an absolute majority in the
Serbian electorate. (In
The KLA (the so-called
"Kosovo Liberation Army" which is a "liberator" for Kosovo
ethnic Albanians only, while considered by the Kosovo Serbs and other ethnic
communities, primarily an terrorist or occupying force) was a military wing of
the one among many Kosovo Albanian procommunist guerrilla groups from 1970s. The
KLA, organized into terrorist units, based in the rural areas filled the vacuum
left in Kosovo that had opened after the
Milosevic, as the main
guarantor of the hard-won peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, enjoyed after
The attempts to normalize
the education of young Albanians (allowing school facilities to be used) and
thus reduce inter-ethnic tensions in Kosovo did not produce the expected results:
the Serbian side treated the education problem as a primarily humanitarian issue,
whereas the Albanian side saw the problem of education system as exclusively
connected to the status question of Kosovo.(21) There were different proposals
coming from the Serbian side on a possible division of Kosovo and Metohija, as a
way to the permanent solution to the problem, while, at the same time, efforts
were being made to situate the problem in a wider economic-geographical context
through different forms of regionalization.(22)
The distanced, almost
irreconcilable attitudes of the Serbian and Albanian side, blocked the peace
efforts in which Slobodan Milosevic and Ibrahim Rugova remained entrenched in
their positions. The impression of foreign observers was that it was a case of
two parallel worlds where each side totally ignored or only demonized the other.(23)
The so-called Kosovo Liberation Army made the breakthrough, in the winter of
1998, with its frequent ambushed attacks on the Serbian police and Serbian
civilians. Milosevic's regime reacted in March 1998 with severe, excessive
police measures, when police killed several dozens of Albanian civilians, while
the Kosovo-Metohija Serbs, more than anyone else, found themselves in a gap, as
potential victims of the growing conflict between terrorist and police forces.(24)
The Serbian Orthodox
Church, has, since 1992, severely condemning Milosevic's regime and asking for
democratic solution of the Kosovo crisis. Already in August 1997, after first
large-scale terrorist actions, the Church took the following position:
"The opinion of
our Church is that the only political solution can be found in clearly defined
national policy and well organized democratic Serbian state integrated with
other European countries. A new democratic state reorganized according to the
models of European parliamentary monarchies will create new circumstances in
which Albanian people of Kosovo will be able to find a satisfactory status
within
Through the
National-Church Assemblies (Crkveno narodni sabori), presided over by the
Raska-Prizren Bishop Artemije, the Kosovo Serbs attempted to impose themselves
as a legitimate partner in the Serbo-Albanian negotiations which, undoubtedly,
were to begin. They feared, having in mind the fate of Krajina Serbs that
Milosevic would in order to save his power, eventually let them down. The
democratic forces of Kosovo Serbs (the National-Church Assembly with the
representatives from all Kosovo municipalities joined by, under the auspices of
Bishop Artemije, also by the Serbian Resistance Movement headed by M. Trajkovic)
condemned all violence, from whichever side it came. They sharply criticized
Milosevic's regime, which instead of political means resorted to direct police
clashes, but they also condemned the KLA (murders of Serbian policemen and of
ethnic Albanians loyal to the state, abductions and murders of Serbian civilians)
which showed that by terrorist acts they want nothing but - "an ethnically
cleansed Kosovo".(26) First KLA started to harass, kidnap or kill isolated
groups of civilians in the villages, but the number of their victims constantly
grew, only to be heralded by the systematic massacres of Serbs, such as the
murder of six young men in Pec, on December, 15 1998.(27)
When it came to the
escalation of conflict in the summer of 1998, after a series of severe clashes,
it was clear that Milosevic would choose the war option to justify the loss of
Kosovo where his police forces were no longer able to control the situation.(28)
At the same time, ethnically mixed villages, in which the Serbian police had
clashed with KLA members, were left either deserted or halved in number. However,
only Serbs left those villages permanently, fearing to face after the withdrawal
of police forces, the retaliation of the KLA supporters or simply Albanian
returnees.(29) The predominance of the Serbian police in the conflict, however,
left the suffering of the Kosovo Serbs almost unnoticed. The international
community was focused on comprehensive Serbian police actions against the Kosovo
Albanians, in which a large number of civilians also lost their lives.(30)
Proportionally, Serbs also
had a large number of casualties. In only a few months between February 1998 and
the summer of the same year, over 200 Serbian civilians disappeared, in whose
fate nobody showed any interest.(31) None of these civilians, among who there
were women and children, were found or released, so the only conclusion is that
they were all killed. Serbs went on leaving the regions of Kosovo where they
were a distinct minority, while the displaced ethnic Albanians, sheltered in the
parts under KLA control, waited for the right moment to return to their homes.
From the talks with the US envoy Robert Gelbard, in which he warned Milosevic
that the resolution of the Kosovo problem could not be infinitely delayed, but
also hinted that the KLA could be put on the list of terrorist organizations,
Milosevic received a signal that military means should be energetically applied.(32)
The threat of bombing
Anti-Milosevic forces at
Kosovo, headed by Bishop Artemije took an balanced position stressing that there
are victims on all sides, and that only mutually acceptable agreement, followed
by structural changes in the system and transition to genuine democratic order.
They rejected ethnic principle that prevailed in October 1998
Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement: "With serious concern the Assembly is
warning the international community that in the "Milosevic Holbrooke
Agreement" the ethnic principle has prevailed. The Agreement permits
constitution of the ethnic Albanian administration in Kosovo and Metohija which
would eventually lead to the mass exodus of the Serbs."(35)
Among many other
conclusions form National Church Assembly, held in Pristina on November 7, 1998
here are the most significant ones:
"5. The Assembly
firmly believes that the lasting and stable settlement between the two opposed
sides in Kosovo and Metohija conflict may be found only within the framework of
the radical system changes in the whole country (and not only in one part of it)
and the restoration of the rule of law. The restoration of democracy and civil
society in
6. The Assembly declares
that any agreement on the status of this part of
7. The Assembly indicates
that any political settlement of the Kosovo and Metohija conflict which would
install the Albanian ethnic administration would be directly opposed to the
universal democratic and civil principles on which the international community
is based. Therefore, the Assembly does not accept discrimination of ethnic
Albanians as second rate citizens in
8. The Assembly underlines
that the solution which would establish new ethnic borders (either internal or
external) would not only be in discord with the 21st century the age of
universal integration but might cause further potential conflicts. The
support of the ethnic Albanian rule in Kosovo and Metohija may only increase
instability in the entire Balkans with long term negative consequences for the
peace.
9. The Assembly reminds
that all previous historic experiences with the Albanian ethnic rule in Kosovo
and Metohija [1968-1987] have had as immediate consequences systematic human
rights violations and mass expulsion of the Serbs as well as the assimilation of
the non-Albanian population (Turks, Slav Moslems, Gypsies, Goranci etc.)"(36)
The Kosovo Serb
representatives urged that "the leaders of Kosovo and Metohija Albanians
should openly condemn the violence in Kosovo and Metohija, first of all the
activity of the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army and other ethnic Albanian
paramilitary groups," and "that international community should
urgently endorse a special resolution which would prevent the militant
activities form the neighboring Albania (terrorist training camps, weapons
smuggling and illegal coming of mercenaries over the border)"(37)
But their main objection
to international mediation was on the envisaged status of Kosovo province:
"If, despite everything, the international community imposed and recognized
the ethnic principle for Kosovo and Metohija Albanians only, the Assembly would
consider organizing of the plebiscite and the establishment Serb self-governance
in Kosovo and Metohija parallel with the Albanian (which would include the right
of self-determination and remaining within the state and constitutional
framework of Serbia) as the only democratic and legitimate means for the
survival of the Serbian people in Kosovo and Metohija and the existence of
Kosovo and Metohija in Serbia."(38)
A few drafts of the future
organization and status of Kosovo preceded the Rambouillet negotiations. The
Kosovo Serbs followed with trepidation the development of events that foreboded
the fatal outcome for
The persistent attempts of
Bishop Artemije, Momcilo Trajkovic and their councilors to involve the
representatives of Kosovo Serbs, who were not under Milosevic's direct control,
in the negotiations were blithely swept aside by both
Nevertheless, in February
1999 the Serbian Orthodox church sent its delegation to
The peace delegation of
the Serbian Orthodox Church also submitted its proposal for cantonization to
State Secretary Madleine Albright in
"In particular, we
believe that
1. NATO intervention would
strengthen the Milosevic regime, which will become the guarantor of an interim
Kosovo implementation agreement. This would be a major setback for the
democratic opposition in
2. We believe that an
interim settlement in Kosovo that grants de facto rule to the Albanians would
result in a complete exodus of Kosovo Serbs from the province. The proposal
currently presented at the Rambouillet negotiations represents full control by
the Albanians over the Kosovo administration, police, judiciary, and executive
power. The recent political experience during the period up until 1989, when
Kosovo Albanians were in full political control of Kosovo province, was marked
by ethnic discrimination which forced Kosovo Serbs to leave the province. We
have every reason to fear that the interim agreement, if implemented, would
result in a repeat of that experience. These fears have found further
confirmation in the driving out of large numbers of Serbian civilians from
Kosovo by Albanian terrorists following the withdrawal of Serbian forces after
the October 1998 Milosevic -Holbrooke agreements. Such an outcome, in fact, if
not in name, would mean the definitive detachment of Kosovo from
3. We are concerned that
certain dominant factions of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), under the
influence of the former communist-inspired leadership from the pre-1989 period,
may present a serious danger to NATO forces if they are deployed in Kosovo.
Potentially even more dangerous are forces under the influence of Islamic
fundamentalists groups connected with terrorist leader Osama bin Laden. As CIA
Director George Tenet stated in his testimony before the US Senate on February
2, 1999, terrorist elements controlled by Osama bin Laden are stepping up their
efforts to target Americans. The presence of such radical forces in northern
In short, the proposed
NATO intervention would strengthen and consolidate the anti-democratic Milosevic
regime, it would unjustly lead to the loss of
The author of the
cantonization plan, Dr. Batakovic, explained the legal and political aspects of
the plan, and the delegation received Mrs. Albright's assurances that the
project would be submitted to the negotiating parties in Rambouillet as a new
possibility. According to what she said later, in the course of her visit to
Kosovo, to Bishop Artemije and Mr. Trajkovic, the plan had been rejected in
Rambouillet by both delegations, for their specific reasons. The official
Yugoslav delegation side wanted to remain the only legitimate negotiator, while
the Albanian delegation wanted the whole of Kosovo for itself, possibly without
Serbs.
After Rambouillet, the
plan for cantonization was during the next stage of negotiations in
NATO's decision to resolve
the Kosovo crisis by military action came at the moment when all the main actors
in the Kosovo conflict had calculated that will be the main beneficiary of the
war. In the eve of their fiftieth anniversary celebration in
For Serbs Kosovo has a
special emotional and political meaning, which was skillfully manipulated during
the previous decade. Milosevic has chosen bombing of
NATO bombing against FR of
Yugoslavia that started on March 24, 1999 strained the Serbian-Albanian
relations in Kosovo to their maximum. The ethnic Albanians were openly rejoicing
at bombs falling on
According to well-informed
sources, the expulsion, as a short-term retaliation, was conceived by Milosevic
himself, who entrusted special irregular and regular police forces with the job
of ethnic cleansing. Suddenly, but only for a moment, the Serbs became the
majority population in Kosovo-Metohija. According to the verbal testimonial of a
monk in Prizren, ethnic Albanians were shocked by the manner, efficiency and
speed of the expulsion: a medical doctor from Prizren openly admitted to a
mentioned monk: (Serbs) did to us what we had been preparing for you"
Regular army and police spent a larger part of the war hiding from NATO bombs.
In other parts of Serbia, where the scale of the destruction of civilian targets
together with a larger number of civilian casualties constantly grew, there
could be neither enough knowledge of nor enough understanding for the protection
and political interests of the Kosovo Albanians who were equated with NATO and
seen as the main cause of the cataclysmic suffering of the whole country.
Two weeks later and after
a poor Russian public political resistance to the NATO attacks, Milosevic
suddenly changed his tactics and ordered that all Kosovo Albanians, who were
hiding in the forests, should return to their homes. A larger group of Albanians
hiding in the mountains returned to Podujevo and to other parts of Lab area.
Following the old Titoist recipe of "brotherhood and unity", Serbian
TV, the main electronic media under Milosevic's control persistently tried to
prove, with long propaganda coverage of this and similar events, that a
significant part of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo were not against Yugoslavia and
that the KLA did not have the support of the majority Kosovo Albanian population.
At the same time,
Milosevic undertook all necessary measures to protect efficiently the Albanian
political leaders who remained in Kosovo. Albanian leaders expected that, after
a few days of air strikes, NATO attacks would bring about the desired result and
open the border to NATO forces. Ibrahim Rugova and Fehmi Agani, the president
and the main ideologist of the Kosovo Democratic League (LDK), were under the
supervision of special police forces, and special attention - in a way even more
discrete than in the case of the LDK leaders, as was learnt from well informed
sources - was given to the protection of a political dissident and former
spokesman of KLA Adem Demaci and the editor of Albanian daily Koha Ditore Veton
Surroi, two influential political and public personalities previously very close
to the KLA. They, unlike Agani who escaped the police control and protection,
survived exclusively due to the permanent, more or less visible protection of
Milosevic's police in Pristina itself.
The protection of police
forces to the people who did not hide their separatist intentions and plans, was
not, of course, motivated by humane reasons, but a favor to be returned if
needed, for the sake of justification of one of the possible political options
that Milosevic counted on. The much publicized meetings between Milosevic and
Rugova in Belgrade, at the time when there was a danger of NATO recognizing an
independent Kosovo and Hashim Thaci, the KLA political leader, as a legitimate
representative of the new state, showed that this practice with adequate police
protection, pays off many times, although in the short term, but this is, as a
rule, the only time scale, that Milosevic counts on in his tactical assessments.(45)
The relations between the
West and Russia over the Kosovo crisis were, in many ways, reminiscent of a
little re-run of the cold war, when the two blocks, for their own reasons,
supported different sides in a conflict, which actually served to reveal and
sort out the problems in the two super-power's relations, in this case a
reinvigorated NATO and the remnant of a super-power. Milosevic seems to have
calculated on Moscow's mediation.(46) His brother, the ambassador to Russia,
probably himself misled by promises from the Russian opposition, assured
Belgrade that Russia would stop NATO aggression against Yugoslavia, primarily
with military threats expected to come after the internal pressures on Yeltsin's
regime.
In the first month of
bombardment, numerous representatives of Russian patriotic, neo-communist and
communist opposition passed through Belgrade, but their support to Serbs never
amounted to more than verbal encouragement to the "Slav and Orthodox
brothers" to persevere in their resistance, and, sometimes in symbolic
participation in music concerts (e.g. Sergey Baburin and Genady Seleznyov) which,
in order to spite NATO, were organized in all major towns of Serbia. Seleznyov,
the president of Russian Duma, moreover, promised to Milosevic that
The vows of the
traditional Russian-Serbian brotherhood and eternal, natural political alliance
between the two peoples, in spite of great response from the Serbian public, and
to an extent in
Other sources confirm that
champagne was opened in the Russian general headquarters when the first NATO
bombs fell on Serbia, not because a military victory could have been expected,
but because of a new opportunity, in the form of the external crisis, to make
Yeltsin and other levers of Russian power change their approach to the Army.
Bearing in mind the fact that, at that moment, the popular Yevgeniy Primakov was
at the head of the Russian government, it was hoped that his intervention on the
behalf of Serbia, supported by the Russian Army, lower house of the Parliament (DUMA)
and pro-opposition public opinion, would have enough influence on the West: it
was even expected that the moment would come for the Russian missiles to turn
their heads towards Germany again
Russian president Boris
Yeltsin, however, quickly dismissed Yevegniy Primakov and appointed Victor
Chernomyrdin as his official intermediary in the Kosovo crisis. That, as an
implicit favor to the West, was politically favorable only for V. Chernomyrdin's
political career. Although inexperienced in diplomacy, Chernomyrdin started his
pre-election campaign for the presidential position with slow and unhurried
consultations throughout Europe and in
The issuing of indictment
against Milosevic for war crimes in Kosovo contributed significantly to the
decision of the Yugoslav president, who deserted by Chernomyrdin and Yeltsin and
pushed into a corner, to accept speedily a total capitulation in Kosovo-Metohija,
under the condition that the new protectorate, under NATO military command,
formally covered by the UN mandate, should not extend to other parts of Serbia
which remained under his control. According to the military technical agreement
signed in Kumanovo, Kosovo is placed under the KFOR (NATO-led) military
protectorate and under the formal authority of the United Nations civil
administration (UN Resolution No 1244).
The agreement, which was
clumsily presented to the public as a victory, was in fact a document on total
and irrevocable capitulation, in content significantly more unfavorable than the
project from Rambouillet and later from
The acceptance of the
military-technical agreement in Kumanovo, in June 1999, had, in a political
sense, a multiple meaning. Firstly, Serbia, which had won Kosovo in the very
same place, after a military victory in the First Balkan war (in the famous
battle in Kumanovo, end of October 1912, the Serbian Royal Army liberated Kosovo
and the Vardar Macedonia, having routed the more numerous Ottoman troops) was
now obliged to lose Kosovo definitively and in the same way as a part of its
territory. Secondly, the agreement in Kumanovo gave, as stressed above, all the
power to the NATO commander of KFOR troops. This was to show the Russians that
their active participation was far less counted on than was the case in the
negotiating process, when Chernomyrdin managed to impose himself as an
unavoidable intermediary does, if not in finding a solution, then at least in
making the proposed solution accepted. NATO's full control in the envisaged
protectorate was of essential significance for its leaders, bearing in mind the
level of frustration in
After a systematic action
by NATO bombers against mainly civilian infrastructure in central and northern
Serbia (power plants, refineries, fertilizer factories, freeways, railways and
bridges) the public morale, after the massive destruction following the last
weeks of May 1999, faced with the end of civilization, gradually deteriorated
and eventually collapsed, a less than few weeks before the Milosevic's
capitulation in Kumanovo, and so Milosevic was able to offer relief in the form
of capitulation with the fig leaf of a UN mandate.
Milosevic congratulated to
the army, and hiding behind UN resolution which formally left Kosovo inside
The last Serbian illusion
referred to the role of
Russian troops were left
without the expected separate sector of responsibility in the north of Kosovo,
the region with majority Serb population, which was coveted by most Serbs as a
protection measure, but rejected as an attempt at division and a renewal of the
cold war both by NATO and the ethnic Albanians. The journalists' questions as to
what kind of division it would be since Kosovo is a part of the FR Yugoslavia
were met with a confused silence or some unconvincing explanations.
After that the UN interim
administration (UNMIK) was established, all the Serbian power, not even formal
any more, was left totally deprived of legitimacy. The masses of Serbian
refugees leaving Kosovo in huge numbers, replaced the Albanian returnees who
rushed immediately, without waiting for a NATO approval, from
For weeks numerous empty
trucks, most often rented, kept arriving from northern Albania, filled with
goods and valuables from the plundered or deserted Serbian houses, and the whole
process was accompanied by a new wave of ethnic cleansing, this time directed
against the Serbs, facilitated by the more or less indifferent approach of KFOR
who were just taking up positions and settling down. Hence it was very easy,
under the pressures of armed Albanians, and not only those from the so-called
KLA, to submit the unarmed Serb civilians to all kinds of violence: from rape
and robbery to expulsion and murder. Since Metohija (the plain between Drenica,
Istok, Pec and Prizren) had a smaller percentage of Serbs than a Kosovo proper,
and since it is geographically closest to Albania, the first blow of the united
forces of Albanian returnees and Albanian bands from the north of Albania landed
on the local Serbs who were ethnically cleansed within a matter of days.(52)
Although a significant
number of Serbs from Pec, Prizren, Djakovica, Istok, Klina and villages in the
wider surroundings of these towns left their homes and started withdrawing with
the Army, fearing cruel Albanian retaliation, nearly half of the Serbs in
Metohija believed that KFOR would protect them and Albanians leave them in peace
(since they took no part in the persecutions of Albanians) and decided to stay
in their homes, a decision for which many of them paid enormous price - a large
number of women, including under age girls and old women were raped, whereas
most men were kidnapped, tortured and eventually killed. The inhabitants of some
small Serbian enclaves, the villages of Gorazdevac near Pec and Velika Hoca near
Prizren, including a few hundred civilians surrounded in Orahovac, organized a
kind of self-defense and later KFOR positioned its forces there in order to
separate the two conflicted ethnic communities. Returnees, who were forced by
Milosevic's regime from the central part of Serbia back to Metohija were
immediately killed; Italian troops, part of KFOR, started guarding the largest
monasteries, Pec Patriarchate and Visoki Decani, which Albanians were preparing
to destroy, only after the repeated warnings of the Metropolitan of Montenegro
Amfilohije Radovic.(53) As stressed by the Western press, "at the
Patriarchate of Pec, another ancient bastion of Christendom near Kosovo's border
with Albania, handful of Serbian priests, nuns and laity have holed up under the
protection of Italian troops. The clergy are kept busy burying the dead and
rescuing icons, relics and bells from the 40 or so churches that have been
damaged or destroyed by vengeful Albanians."(54)
The celebration of 610th
anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, June 28, 1999, proved to be the most sad
event for the Serbs, who being under comprehensive wave of retaliation by Kosovo
Albanians, and still unprotected by KFOR, were facing an exodus. The Serbian
Patriarch Paul with several Bishops visited the famous battlefield accompanied
with heavily armed British KFOR soldiers. The Patriarch Paul and Bishop Artemije
warned the western government that "if nothing is done in the nearest
future, we are seriously afraid that all Kosovo Serbs would be forced to leave
the province."(55) As observed by British reporter, "In practice. It
is harder and harder to survive as a Serb - or, some would say, as anyone but an
ethnic Albanian - in Kosovo."(56)
The biggest massacre took
place on July
Only the Church remained
with the Serbian people in Kosovo- Metohija in the most difficult time: both low
and high officials of Milosevic's regime from the province were the first to
leave Kosovo with their families, while a significant part of the civilian
Serbian population left their homes with the army and the police forces, fearing
ruthless retaliation. In the first three months of KFOR administration in Kosovo,
from approximately 220,000-250,000 Serbs living in Kosovo-Metohija, over 150,000
of them moved further up north in inner Serbia (Romas, i.e. Gypsies and some
Muslim Slavs, whose houses were also burnt or occupied by ethnic Albanians also
left the province which became NATO protectorate).(59)
The documentation,
received from church sources in Kosovo, gives the data on the number of Kosovo
Serbs in bigger cities before and after the arrival of KFOR:
- Gnjilane: Of 25,000
Serbs the number fell to 5,000
- K. Mitrovica: Of 27,000
the number fell to 15,000 Serbs
- Kosovo Polje: Of 20,000
the number fell to 10,000 Serbs
- Pec: Of
- Pristina (the town
itself): Of 30,000, the number fell to 500-1000 persons
- Prizren: Of 5-
At least half of them left
after threats, attacks, murders and looting by the Kosovo Albanians: the Serbs
were ethnically cleansed first in larger towns where they were a minority (in
Pristina the number of Serbs has fallen about forty times since the arrival of
KFOR, from nearly 40,000 to 1,000), whereas the Serbs from Prizren and Pec
disappeared almost completely, the only ones who remained were too old to travel.
The Serbs in Prizren and Urosevac were exposed to similar persecutions. The
sorrowful picture of a new wave of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and Metohija this
time from Serbs took place in all parts of Metohija (which, after the adopted
Albanian terminology, is called 'western Kosovo" in Western sources) where
Serbs, unlike in Kosovo itself, were a distinct minority.(61)
Parallel with persecution
of the Serbian civilians, the target of the Albanian retaliation were numerous
Serbian Orthodox monasteries, ranging from medieval Byzantine-type monuments to
the more recent churches erected in the sixteenth century and later, until last
decade. Over 70 Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries were first plundered,
and then either totally destroyed or desecrated and damaged to the extent that
they are impossible to repair. One third of these churches were high-ranking
cultural monuments dating from the medieval period with invaluable frescoes or
remains of frescoes (St. Marko Koriski church and monastery in Korisa near
Prizren, monasteries Zociste near Orahovac and Devic in Drenica, Church in
Petric, Bogorodicna crkva (Our Lady church) in Musutiste, Sveta Trojica (Holy
Trinity) near Suva Reka, St. Archangels monastery near Kosovska Vitina, Sveti
Jovan Krstitelj (St. John the Baptist) church in Samodreza near Vucitrn, several
more recent Serbian cathedrals build in Djakovica and Urosevac etc).(62) As
stressed by Western observers "this demolition cannot be just 'revenge'
NATO's usual excuse for the destruction under its auspices. You do not just
fill with rage and spend days gathering explosives to blow up churches. This is
vandalism with a mission."(63)
This "vandalism with
a mission" is, undoubtedly an integral part of every standard practice of
ethnic cleansing: the stones of the destroyed churches are taken to other places
in order to erase all the traces of Serbs once living there. The Pec
Patriarchate and, somewhat less, monastery of Visoki Decani are still today
occasionally shelled from the surrounding hills. Metohija, apart form several
hundred Serbs still living under siege in Gorazdevac is ethnically cleansed part
of Kosovo-Metohija province. Even more dangerous is the pattern of albanization
of Serbian monuments. Many "Albanian intellectuals" and "historians"
are advocating simply 'takeover' of the Serbian monuments as Albanian ones, as
they, for example, Bogorodica Ljeviska (Our Lady of Ljevisa), had been turned
into mosques during the Ottoman domination.(64)
The results of the ethnic
cleansing would be even more extensive if the representatives of the Serbian
Orthodox Church had not stood up to protect the Kosovo Serbs. On June 15, 1999
the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church made a public call for Milosevic's
resignation and the formation of the national salvation government. At the
beginning of July 1999, Bishop Artemije met with the Albanian representative,
under the supervision of the UN interim administrator (Sergio Vierra de Melo),
to agree on how to halt the wave of violence against Serbs and the establishment
of tolerable relations between the two highly antagonized ethnic communities.
The Albanians, however, abused the joint statement of July 2,
Serbian signatories
accepted cooperation tending, to avoid a further spiraling violence and to bind
the Albanian side - primarily the KLA which remained the only armed military
ethnic group - to prevent violence against Serbs and other ethnic groups which
started immediately after KFOR came into the province.. But the Albanian
practical moves, contrasting the agreed measures forced the Serbian Orthodox
Church representatives, from the Metropolitan Amfilohije to Bishop Artemije, to
distance themselves from the Albanians.
Bishop Artemije and Mr.
Trajkovic sent a letter to the temporary chief of UNMIK Sergio de Melo in which
they accused Thaci of heading "celebration and unrest in Pristina",
only two hours after signing the agreement. On this occasion the monuments to
Serbian writers Vuk St. Karadzic and Petar II Petrovic-Njegos were demolished,
and soon after, a new, unfinished Serbian church in Pristina was blown up.
Asking the UNMIK chief to "call the representatives of KLA to submit the
full details about the arrested and kidnapped Serbs without any delay ",
they stressed that they had "clear indications that camps for Serbs are
still existent in Kosovo. Who runs them and how long they will go on existing
are the questions to be answered by the KFOR representatives. It was also
demanded that the "crimes committed by different armed Albanian formations
against the Kosovo Serbs be fully investigated by the Hague international
tribunal for crimes in the territory of former Yugoslavia, and not by local
Kosovo courts"(65).
Instead of formal promises
more energetic measures on the ground were asked for, which would force the
leaders of the KLA and other Albanian paramilitary and irregular police
formations to suppress the waves of violence which, with the rhythm of five to
ten Serbs killed every day, with systematic expulsions from certain regions and
accompanying destruction of sacred buildings, continued with the unrelenting
force.(66)
In its new statement from
July 5 the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox church stressed that it expected
"international forces to stop as soon as possible the terror tactics used
against the Serbian, Muslim and Roma population by KLA members and other groups
of Kosovo Albanians and those from neighboring Albania which are using KFOR as a
shield for the total ethnic cleansing of the Serbian people. We also expect the
honorable members of the Albanian people to stand up to the revenge and
retaliation carried out by some of their compatriots these days against innocent
people. All crimes committed from either side in the course of this tragic civil
and ethnic conflict must be brought up before unbiased international courts, so
that divine and human justice can be satisfied."(67)
The continuation of
violence, however, forced the Serbian Orthodox Church to try again to answer the
present burning questions to their believers. In the statement issued after the
Episcopal consultation it was stressed that they supported "all democratic
and patriotic forces in our country and their demands for radical and speediest
possible changes in our society, starting from the formation of the temporary
transitional government and the preparations for immediate elections". The
KFOR and UNMIK representatives were, however, requested by Serbian Orthodox
Church to stop the terror and total ethnic cleansing of Orthodox Serbs and other
ethnic minorities, perpetrated in their presence and, as stressed by the Church,
under their auspices. If the Yugoslav government is to be blamed for previous
evils that took place in Kosovo and Metohija, the international forces, which
have taken over the power and thus the full and undisputed responsibility for
security in Kosovo and Metohija,(68) are responsible for the present crimes, the
planned and systematic destruction of the Serbian people and their centuries-old
holy places, churches and monasteries and whole villages and regions. The
persecution did not diminish. Serbs fought back, by erecting barricades, by
demanding that the disappeared and kidnapped be released (who were as a rule
killed), in spite of all this 11,000 Serbs were expelled at the time from Obilic
alone. At the same time, systematic attacks on stronger Serbian enclaves in
Kosovo went on, so the
A part of Kosovo-Metohija
Serbs, deprived of secured corridor for passage to central Serbia, found
temporary shelter in the neighboring enclaves with a Serbian majority, and thus
in a very short time Kosovo (without Metohija) became spontaneously cantonized
in the manner very similar to the cantonization map created by the Serbian
Orthodox Church and the Serbian Renewal Movement from Kosovo long before the
beginning of the war. From the five cantons on the map of the proposed
cantonization (see the map enclosed) only the Metohija canton does not exist,
whereas the other four are now reinforced with the influx of new Serbian
arrivals. The largest and most significant concentration of Serbs, in the north
of Kosovo, encompasses the largest Serbian enclave, stretching from Kosovska
Mitrovica (one fifth of the town with a Serbian majority, the northern part
across the river Ibar) and Zvecan to Leposavic and Zubin Potok. Thanks to,
primarily, French troops of the KFOR forces, the "reunification" of
Kosovska Mitrovica did not happen, that is, the local Serbs were not totally
expelled as they were from other Kosovo towns, so that their houses and flats
could be taken over by the Albanians. KFOR forces boasted of having reduced the
scope of violence against Serbs in other places, forgetting to clarify the main
reason for this: the cessation of violence against Serbs was not the result of
the reinforced security of certain sectors but primarily of the fact that the
Serbs had almost disappeared from those regions.
Nevertheless, spontaneous
cantonization has kept, at this moment, around 90-100,000 Serbs in the four
separate zones: 1) north, which spreads to the north of the river Ibar and
Kosovska Mitrovica, to which came the citizens of the region around Vucitrn; 2)
central, which encompasses the territory between the village of Gracanica and
town of Lipljan with tens of Serbian villages, to which came some citizens from
Pristina and neighboring villages 3) the region from Kosovska Kamenica to
Gnjilane, where the Serbian majority from a part of Gnjilane is finding shelter;
4) in the zone of Strpce with the Brezovica mountain where some of the Serbs
from Prizren and surrounding region fled from violence and persecution. After
the arrival of KFOR, the cantonization plan (which would be implemented, in a
revised variant, with the approval of the UN), which envisaged the preservation
of special ties between the Serbian zones (or cantons) in Kosovo and the state
of Serbia was explained to Serbs who greeted and supported it massively at all
their meetings in Kosovo. The support to the cantonization project also came
from most opposition democratic parties in
Remaining faithful to the
principle position that multi-ethnic Kosovo should be preserved and that bridges
of trust should be re-built, Serbs authorized Bishop Artemije and Momcilo
Trajkovic to represent them in the Kosovo Interim council presided over by
Bernard Kouchner, on behalf of the UN, where ethnic Albanians are represented by
the representatives of the KLA, LDK and other political groups. The key question
for Serbs was the security issue: the Kosovo Interim Council, however, discussed
only the questions concerning Albanian security and humanitarian problems,
whereas Serbian proposals concerning the similar needs were either ignored or
openly rejected, by the UN administrator or Albanian representatives.(71)
UNMIK and UNHCR
representatives in Kosovo during the first months were operating with completely
inaccurate number of remaining Serbs, giving the top figure of 30,000. Only
after frequent and energetic protests from Bishop Artemije, the number was
officially raised to reasonable number of approximately 97,000 on September 11,
1999.(72) The persecutions of Serbian civilians and systematic destruction of
churches was not, however, halted. Although all the representatives of the
international community, from Xavier Solana to Bernard Kouchner said that the
revenge policy in Kosovo was totally unacceptable, almost nothing has been done
to stop systematic persecution of Kosovo Serbs.(73) The only exception turned
out to be a muscle action of French troops and policemen in Kosovska Mitrovica
area, where they successfully halted ethnic Albanians to repeat the persecution
of Serb with taking over their property followed, a pattern already applied in
other parts of the province.(74)
The Serbian members of the
Kosovo Interim Council witnessed that their justified demands, completely in
accord with the proclaimed aims of both military and civil mission - were more
or less diplomatically ignored, particularly the key question of efficient
protection of Serbs. In order to raise security issue as a priority, they
repeatedly broke off co-operation with UNMIK as a sign of protest against
accelerated ethnic cleansing taking place before the very eyes of KFOR and UNMIK.
The representatives of both military and civil administration just shrugged
their shoulders, complaining about their inability to protect every single
individual, stressing that they were understaffed, etc. But, the main problem
for the Serbian representatives was that all the attacks against Serbs, instead
of being qualified as a calculated plan of ethnic cleansing, were described as
incidents, and there were even those from among the international
representatives who tried to justify the understandable desire for retaliation
among ethnic Albanians after great crimes committed, on behalf of the Serbian
side, against them before and during NATO bombardment.(75) A journalist Veton
Surroi made the only exception on the Albanian side. He dared to condemn the
systematic violence against Kosovo Serbs after June
The Bishop Artemije, who
had been condemning violence on both sides for years, warned that it was the
duty of KFOR and UNMIK to provide effective protection for all Kosovo Serbs, and
condemned the fact that greater persecutions with more devastating results
happened under the international protectorate than during the war with NATO or
even under Milosevic's rule. One ethnic cleansing, as stressed the Bishop, was
substituted with another a fact for which, to the surprise of democratically and
pro-western orientated Serbs, the international community somehow showed their
full understanding. M. Trajkovic warned that only the extremists on both sides
can claim their victory: KLA which proclaimed as their goal an ethnically
cleansed Kosovo and Milosevic who, before the Serbian public again, gets new
proof that the international community has been deliberately undermining general
Serbian interests, rather than as publicly claimed, fighting the non-democratic
Serbian regime represented by Milosevic.
Through a revised
cantonization draft, which would be implemented in full co-operation with UNMIK
and KFOR, Bishop Artemije and M. Trajkovic tried to create an inter-space which
would allow Serbs - of whom there are still about 90 to
On September 18, 1999, the
Bishops' synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church issued a strong warning statement
in which it demanded that, respecting the UN Charter and general values of
Christian and entire modern civilization, the representatives of the
international community (UNMIK and KFOR including other NGO's), should halt the
ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Serbs in the Kosovo province and stop the evil wave
of systematic destruction of Serbian churches and monasteries.(79)
The Serbian
representatives in the Kosovo Interim Council were, however, left without a
counter-proposal of the international community that would efficiently protect
the Serbian people and their monuments in ethnically cleansed Metohija and in
Kosovo proper, while, at the same time, all proposals of the Serbian side were,
as observed by all independent analysts, cynically ignored or rejected.(80)
After many failed attempts to have some of their proposals accepted, feeling
unable to help their people in Kosovo-Metohija in an efficient way the
representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and Serb National-Church Assembly
(although they enjoyed up to 90 percent support of Kosovo Serbs), decided to
withdraw from the Kosovo Interim Council. In this way they refused to serve, as
Serbian representatives as a formal cover for UNMIK plans, which, as was
assessed, were deeply contradictory to the basic interests of the Serbian people
and the Serbian Orthodox church in Kosovo-Metohija. During the same period,
under UNMIK authority, all other important institutions in Kosovo-Metohija,
after the expulsion of Kosovo Serbs (some exceptions in Kosovska Mitrovica area
only) became ethnically purely Albanian. The Serbian representatives considered
that the absence of basic protection of endangered Kosovo Serbs was not, as
explained by representatives of the international community, the lack of
soldiers within KFOR troops and proportionally small number of international
policemen. They noticed the obvious absence of political will among those among
those in leading NATO states who are to decide upon the future of Kosovo.
Bishop Artemije, the
protector of Serbs and ethnic Albanians alike, before and during NATO air
strikes, although open to cooperation, found out that the representatives of
international community. The UNMIK and KFOR, were either unwilling or unable
neither to guarantee a short-term protection to Kosovo Serbs. Apart from tiny
part of Kosovska Mitrovica and northern (Zvecan, Leposavic and Zubin Potok) area,
the full political responsibility of UNMIK and military control of KFOR proved
to be inefficient and unwilling to match chaos and KLA-orchestrated violence
against the Serbs. In contrast, all the Serbian proposal were ignored or refused,
although were usually dealing with basic security issues. Therefore, after three
months of unsuccessful attempts to obtain the minimal protection of Serbs and
their property in Kosovo-Metohija, on September 22, 1999, Bishop Artemije,
together with Momcilo Trajkovic decided to definitively leave the Kosovo Interim
Council. The immediate reason was the formation of "Kosovo Protection Corps",
after only formal disarmament of the KLA (in fact, as noticed by foreign
correspondents, only old and disused guns were handed in). Kosovo Protection
Corps was created, from, as expected, ethnic Albanian (KLA) members only. This
legalization of mono-national Albanian police and army forces fitted in with
ambiguity on future Kosovo status, announcing that, an independent Kosovo,
cleansed of Serbs, should be recognized in a near future. Bishop Artemije and
Trajkovic stressed, on that occasion, that in return; "Serbs in Kosovo are
fully justified in asking for the realization of the demand for cantonization
and the creation of the Serbian Protection Corps."(81)
After three months of
suffering under the KFOR and UNMIK authority, the position of Serbs, according
to the statement of Raska-Prizren Bishopric, is still dramatically deteriorating.
In his public statement Bishop Artemije underlined that the results under the UN
and KFOR protectorate are devastating: nearly 200,000 Serbs left Kosovo (percentage
higher than that of Kosovo ethnic Albanians during the NATO bombing) and that
over 350 Serbian civilians were killed, over 450 disappeared,(82) while
thousands of Serbian houses plundered and burned, or both, and that more than 70
churches and monasteries razed. Bishop stressed that all this has happened after
the war was over and after all Serbian military and police forces left Kosovo.
This wave of ethnic cleansing against the Serbs happened under full
responsibility of nearly 50,000 soldiers and other members of international
peace keeping forces.(83) Serbs were, practically, expelled from all
multi-ethnic regions and forced to live in ad hoc created areas, as stated by
the Bishop Artemije, Indian-like reservations or Jewish-like ghettos. The Serbs
are also denied their basic human rights and the right of freedom of movement,
education, work and health care. Among older Serbian citizens of Kosovo it did
not go unnoticed that in the World War II, after the first wave of violence in
1941, the level of Serb protection was in some areas significantly better than
KFOR protection operating on behalf of the United Nations.
The policy of "double
standard" often underlined by the Serbs is quite visible in the KFOR slow
and unmotivated search for Serb victims of terror and violence. In search for
mass graves of the Albanian victims the OSCE experts, on various occasions,
opened graves in which they discovered only Serbian victims.. They, for instance,
found a Serbian mass-grave in the village of Ugljare with 13 Serbian corpses
from a nearby village, Ranilug, but the KFOR representatives in Gnjilane tried
to diminish the significance of this discovery, refusing to specify whether the
victims of the massacre were of Serbian nationality.(84)
Nothing has changed since
the Kosovo Serb representatives warned on UNMIK and KFOR forces. Serbian
Orthodox Churches had been still destroyed, and persecutor of the Serbs
unpunished. As witnessed by journalist of The Independent two months after
Bishop Artemije and Trajkovic protesting against the persecution of the Kosovo
Serbs, left Kosovo interim Council the ethnic cleansing is still l'ordre de jour
for Kosovo Albanians: "The postwar "ethnic cleansing" of Kosovo's
Serbs appears to be nearing completion as armed Albanians continue to murder and
kidnap the tiny minority of Serbs who remain in the province more than five
months after NATO troops arrived in the words of their UN mandate "to
ensure public safety and order". Of Pristina's 40,000 Serb population, only
400 are left. Statistics from the Serb church and a human rights group in
Pristina suggest as many as 316 Serbs have been murdered and 455 more kidnapped,
many of them killed, since NATO's arrival. If these figures bear any relation to
reality and most are accompanied by names and dates then the number of
Serbs killed in the five months since the war comes close to that of Albanians
murdered by Serbs in the five months before NATO began its bombardment in March.
Most Serb victims died in the first two months after NATO's entry, but
house-burning and murder continues. [] But since neither NATO nor K-For will
admit that a conflict continues under their control in Kosovo, albeit a largely
one-sided one in which the Serbs are the principal victims, war crimes tribunal
officials cannot investigate the killing of Serbs. This means their murderers
have only the largely impotent UN police force to reckon with. No wonder, then,
that minority groups continue to flee Kosovo. The 300-strong Croat community at
Letnice were preparing to celebrate their 700th anniversary in the province but
left en masse last month for
The UN and KFOR mission in
Kosovo-Metohija can be judged on two levels. Officially the whole military
operation started in order to prevent ethnic cleansing and humanitarian
catastrophe. The fact that hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians, expelled
during the NATO bombing, managed to return safely to Kosovo-Metohija is only one
side of the coin. If the KFOR and UNMIK mission claim that they has been
successful, then there must be an unknown, hidden agenda that is significantly
different from the one that is publicly proclaimed and which is based on the UN
resolution No 1244.
Compared with solemnly
proclaimed principles and values of the European Union,
The "Berlin Wall"
between Serbia and Albania has been pulled down, but it seems that, as far as
Albanians are concerned, everything is being done for a new one to be erected,
this time between Kosovo province and the rest of Serbia.(87) The broader
geopolitical impact of this kind of policy will have far reaching effects not
only for Serbs who are left again to disappear from the territory they inhabited
for nearly a millennium. The other possibly devastating consequences are the
following: the attempt of Albanian nationalist to destabilize and divide the FYR
Macedonia could be probably followed by a civil war in
Policy-makers should,
therefore, taking into consideration recent developments in Kosovo, pledge
themselves to ensure, at first place, an unbiased and highly efficient
protection for all ethnic groups in Kosovo, including the respect of their
differences and rights to their own languages and cultures, with the efficient
protection of their respective cultural heritage. The lack of multicultural
practice, democratic political culture and inter-ethnic tolerance, will impose
the interim solutions: the mentioned rights should be preserved by the
establishment of some form of temporary security zones, or priority security
zones, cantonization, or some similar form of interim internal territorial
reorganization in the coming period, in order to protect the human rights of
each ethnic community. This could secure simultaneously a self-rule for ethnic
Albanians in their areas, but also badly needed protection of Kosovo Serbs and a
kind of self-rule on their territory. All measures concerning status issues
should, apart from well-known Albanian demands, meet the basic demands of the
Kosovo Serbs: to preserve a special political ties with Serbia and Yugoslavia,
as a first step towards surviving and avoiding a total national catastrophe.
Return of the all refugees, as a basic demand of international community should
be another step in confidence-building process. The Kosovo issue rest, however,
directly tied to the further democratization of
* Ass. Professor at the
Faculty of Philosophy,
1 D. T. Batakovic, "Srbi
i Albanci: istorija, sukobi, perspektive" ("Serbs and Albanians:
History, Conflicts and Perspectives"), Hriscanska misao, ono.4-8.
2 For more information see:
Radovan Samardzic et allii, Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji (Kosovo and
Metohija in the Serbian History), Srpska knjizevna zadruga,
3 Cf. Dusan T. Batakovic,
The Kosovo Chronicles,
4 The most comprehensive
picture of the period is given in a scrupulously conducted scientific survey:
Ruza Petrovic and Marina Blagojevic, The Migrations of Serbs and Montenegrins
from Kosovo and Metohija, the Results of a Scientific Survey Conducted in 1986,
Demografski zbornik, No 2, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Belgrade 1992 (Serbian
original of this book was published already in 1989 without D. T. Batakovic's
historical survey included into slightly shortened English editions ).
5 Dusan T. Batakovic,
"Kosovo i Metohija:istorijsko nasledje i geopoliticka ogranicenja" (Kosovo
and Metohija: Historical Heritage and Geopolitical Limitations), Kosovo and
Metohija: Challenges and Answers, The Institute of geopolitical studies,
6 Cf. typical example: Ali
Jakupi, "Origins and Motives of Serbian Myths in Kosovo" Eurobalkans,
no. 34-35, spring/summer
7 See my book for further
explanation: D.T. Batakovic, Kosovo i Metohija. Istorija i ideologija (Kosovo
and Metohija: History and Ideology), Hriscanska misao, Belgrade-Valjevo 1998.
And also, the second printing of my book from
8 Comprehensive scholarly
documentation with appropriate interpretations can be found in: Atanasije Jevtic
(ed.) Zaduzbine Kosova. Spomenici i znamenja srpskog naroda (Kosovo Endowments:
Monuments and Vestiges of Serbian People), Prizren-Belgrade 1987, see specially
the contributions of Mitar Pesikan
9 For more detail: Gabriel
Jandot, L'Albanie d'Enver Hohxa, L'Harmattan, Paris 1994.
10 Two good insights in
different and essentially irreconcilable Serbian and Albanian positions on
Kosovo are given in two collections of articles from a symposium under the
auspices of European mediators: Kosovo: Ger Duijzings, Dusan Janjic, Skelzen
Maliqi (eds.) Kosovo-Kosova. Confrontation or Coexistence, Peace Research,
12 Noel Malcolm, Kosovo. A
Short History,
13 "Proceed with
caution in Kosovo, Newsday (
14 D. T. Batakovic, "Kosovo-Metohija
in the 20th Century: Nationalism and Communism", Eurobalkans, No 30-31,
16 Cf. the legal
documentation: Kosovo: Law and Politics. Kosovo in Normative Acts before and
after 1974. Helsinki Committee for Human rights in
18 "Minorit
albanaise et gopolitique de la drogue",
19 Stefan Lipsius, "Bewaffenter
Widerstand formiert sich", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurt, March
4, 1998; Christophe Chiclet, "Aux origines de l'Arme de libration du
Kosovo", Le monde diplomatique, mai 1999,
20 See my article on
possible solutions of the Kosovo question within the initiative of a German
foundation Bertelsmann: D.T. Batakovic, "Kosovo-Metohija Question: Origins
of a Conflict and Possible Solutions", Dialogue, vol. 7, No 25,
21 The Milosevic Rugova
agreement, signed under the auspices of Sant' Egido organization, never came
into effect due to different interpretations : "Nasa Borba,
22 Dusan T. Batakovic,
"Progetti serbi di spartazione", Kosovo: Il triangolo dei Balcani,
Limes, No 3, Roma 1998, pp.153-169. It is worth looking at the discussion "Kako
resiti kosovsko pitanje" ("How to solve the Kosovo issue "), in
Knjizevne novine which published the discussion of the following participants:
D.T. Batakovic, Slobodan Samardzic, Dragoljub M. Popovic, Zoran Lutovac, Zorica
Radovic, Sreten Ugricic and Miodrag Perisic; no. 973, May 1, 1998. and no. 974,
May 15, 1998.
23 See the analysis:
Parallel worlds, Institute for War & Peace, MEDIA FOCUS 3
24 "Kosovo Serbs live
in fear of future", Chicago Tribune, February 22, 1999 by Tom Hundley; See
also Crown prince Alexander of Yugoslavia, "Kosovo is Only Part of the
Problem in the Balkans", International Herald Tribune, February 20-21m 1999
25 "The problem of
Kosovo", August 1997, Taken from internet site: www.decani@yunet.com
26 See also, Roberto
Morozzo dellla Rocca, "Le chemin de la guerre", Hors-srie, Golias/Limes,
t 1999, pp. 33-41. with details on the American policy towards Kosovo and
the relation of the American administration towards the KLA.
27 "Krvava bajka na
pragu Patrijarsije" ("Bloody tale on the threshold on the Patriarchate"),
Glas javnosti,
28 Cf. "
29 "In Two Months 186
Serbs Left Villages around Podujevo", Vecernje novosti, November 20, 1998,
by M. Kikovic
30 Predominantly
pro-Albanian interpretation of the events in the report of the International
Crisis Group: The Kosovo Spring. The International Crisis Group Guide to Kosovo,
Brussels 1998, On Serbian attitudes pp. 77-82 see also: D.T. Batakovic, "Kosovska
kriza: izazovi i ishodi" ("Kosovo crisis: challenges and outcomes"),
Knjizevne novine, No. 971, Belgrade, April 1, 1998, p. 1.
31 Cf. "White Book"
of the Yugoslav authorities: Terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija and
32 D. Anastasijevic "Gorka
sargarepa", Vreme, February 28, 1998, pp. 17-18.
33 Nasa Borba, October 8,
1998, pp. 1-2
34 See Danas, January 18,
1999, p. 1: "Posle obracuna snaga bezbednosti i OVK u selu Racak kod
Stimlja Vlada Srbije odobrava svet o{tro osudjuje akciju" ("After the
clashes between the police forces and the KLA in the
35 Taken from Internet
site: www.kosovo.com, Assembly was held in Pristina, November 7, 1998.
36 Taken from Internet:
www.kosovo.com
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid, Pristina,
November 7, 1998.
39 See Hill's interview
"Mi ne stvaramo tre}u republiku na Kosovu" ("We are not creating
the third republic in Kosovo") in: Danas,
40 "Zasedao vanredni
Arhijerejski sabor Srpske pravoslavne crkve. SPC ipak u Rambujeu ("The
extra-ordinary session of the bishop union of the Serbian Orthodox Church.
"The Serbian Orthodox Church In Rambouillet, After All") Blic,
41 The cantonization
project prepared already in September 1998, after Halki meeting of Bertelsmann
group for Kosovo was first published as full text in Sloboda (Liberty), the
fortnightly of the Serbian National Defense in America: D. T. Batakovic, "Kantonizacija
Kosova i Metohije", Sloboda, Chicago, no. 1737, December 10, 1998, pp. 1-2.
Later the same project was presented to wider audience by D. T. Batakovic in
42 Full text available on
site: www.kosovo.com and www.decani.yunet.com
43 "A bungled war",
The Economist,
44 See a rather critical
analyses of the Kosovo crisis development and NATO operations in: Ignatio
Ramonet et Alain Gresh, "La nouvelle guerre des Balkans" Le monde
diplomatique, Manire de voir No 45, mai-juin 1999.( a collection of previously
published articles).
45 "Milosevic i
Rugova pripremaju sporazum o Kosovu" ("Milosevic and Rugova Preparing
For an Agreement on Kosovo"), Danas,
46 See a characterstic
reasoning by Predrag Simic: "Rusija je kljuc" ("
47 "Bezumni rat NATO
protiv SRJ ugrozava medjunarodni mir. Predsednik Milosevic primio predsednika
DUME Seleznjova" Danas,
48 "No end in sight",
The Economist,
49 For Russian
expectations at the last stage of the Kosovo crisis see: Konflikt v Kosovo:
novii kontekst formirovania rossiiskih nacionalnih interesov, Moskovkii centr
Instituta Vostok-Zapad, Moskva juni
50 See a text by Kosta
Cavoski, "Porazavajuca pobeda" ("Devastating Victory"),
Hriscanska misao, 5-8, Valjevo 1999, p. 17.
51 See a text from the
52 "Potpuni nestanak
Srba samo pitanje vremena" ("The total disappearance of Serbs is just
the question of time"), Danas,
53. Svetigora, Cetinje, no.
87, p.
54. Quotation from: "Sad
Serb", The Economist,
55 "Church warns over
attacks on Serbs", Financial Times,
56 "Sad Serb",
The Economist,
57 "Krvavi petak u
Starom Gracku" ("Bloody Friday in Staro Gracko"), Vreme,
58 "Jugoslavija trazi
od Saveta bezbednosti da zaustavi etnicko ciscenje na Kosovu" ("
59 Cf. the documentation
in Blic,
60 Ibid
61 According to the UNHCR
data, from the beginning of June until the July 26, 172,061 people fled Kosovo
and Metohija, 90 percent of the number were Serbs. There were 132,789 officially
registered refugees in
62 "The Serb church
has issued its own list of destroyed or partly demolished buildings. Between 13
June when NATO troops entered Kosovo and 20 October, they say, 74
churches have been turned to dust or burnt or vandalised. The 15th-century
monastery of the Holy Trinity above Musutiste, begun in 1465, has been levelled
with explosives. The monastery of the
The rubble of Orthodox
churches across Kosovo stands as a monument to Kosovo Albanian vandalism and to
NATO's indifference or at the least incompetence. After declaring that
Kosovo must remain a "multi-ethnic society", 40,000 troops from K-For
cannot, it seems, look after its historical heritage against the violence of
those whom its spokesmen treated as allies in the war against
63 The Independent,
64 The statement of the
Raska-Prizren diocese of September 17, 1999: "Today (September 17) the
representative of the Rasko-Prizren diocese, prioress Katarina Vujasin visited
Prizren accompanied by the British KFOR folowing the news that the so-called
Albanian national museum in Prizren wants to appropriate the most important holy
objects of our Church and people in Prizren. Two days ago, a certain professor
Muhamed Sukrija, the director of the newly established museum, sent a written
request to the German KFOR, asking that the Bogorodica Ljeviska Church, erected
by the king Milutin in the fourteenth century and the monastery complex St.
Archangels with valuable remains of mosaics from the middle ages, be put under
the museum's jurisdiction. With the intention of proving their historical right
and the claim that the mentioned objects are a part of the Albanian cultural
heritage, Mr. Sukrija brought photographs of the Bogorodica Ljeviska church from
the time of Ottoman rule with a minaret, claiming that the building had been a
mosque before the Serbs converted it into a church. The church itself, according
to the prioress Katarina, is not adequately secured and a few days ago some
Albanians had removed the barbed wire placed by the German KFOR in order to
protect this valuable monument from plundering and destruction. Prof. Sukrija
demands from our Church that a discussion be organized before KFOR
representatives in which the Albanians will officially request their cultural
monuments, which have been ostensibly taken over by the Serbs. Mr. Sukrija is
particularly interested in the valuable remains of Sv. Arhangel mosaics. The
representatives of German KFOR are in quandary before such demands.
Unfortunately, after the physical genocide against the Serbian people in Prizren
the extremists are not set on the Serbian spiritual and artistic treasure,
supporting their claims with their sham-historical theories. Maybe we'll even
see the day when the Albanians will attempt to appropriate the Decani monastery,
which was, according to their historical books, erected by the Gashi tribe, and
perhaps even the Pec Patriarchy."
65 "Prekinuti s
nasiljem ili prekid saradnje", Vladika Artemije i M. Trajkovic zapretili
liderima kosovskih Albanaca, posebno Hasimu Taciju, ("Stop the violence or
we'll stop the cooperation", Bishop Artemije and M. Trajkovic warned the
leaders of the Kosovo Albanians, and especially Hashim Thaci), Danas,
66 See Danas,
67 Glasnik a bulletin of
the Serbian Orthodox Church, No. 7, Belgrade, July 1999, p. 126. (Sin. No. 1102)
68 Quoted from: Vreme,
69 Blic,
70 See Glas Javnosti,
71 NIN,
72 "Igra brojki za
politicke potrebe" ("A game with numbers for political purposes"),
Danas,
74 "French Troops
Feel Anger of Albanian Kosovars", International Herald Tribune, August 9,
1999, p. 5.
76 Koha Ditore, Pristina,
August 18, 1999 (in Albanian). According to some Albanian verbal testimonials,
Adem Demaci said, before withdrawing from public life, that the Albanians had
proved to be five times worse than the Serbs in committing crimes.
77 While Hubert Vedrine
warned that the cantonisation project is not envisaged by the UN resolution,
Joschka Fischer admitted that "there is no safety for Serbs and Romas (Gypsies)
in Kosovo", Danas,
78 "Kantonizacija
jedina prepreka etnickom ciscenju Kosova. Medjunarodna zajednica rizikuje da
propadne njen koncept multietnickog Kosova" ("Cantonisation is the
only hope against the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The international community
risks the failure of its concept of multi-ethnic Kosovo"), Blic,
79 The statement of the
Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church of September 18, 1999 : "The
Synod appeals to the international community that basic principles of human
rights and freedoms, which they advocate so fervently and, indeed, implement in
their own countries, should be also respected in case of the Serbian people. The
Synod expects and demands that the international forces in Kosovo and Metohija
stop further suffering of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Serbian people and other
non-Albanian population, and do everything to facilitate the return of all those
who had fled the country. The Synod also expects the international community to
help the Serbian people to realize their right to life in the territory in which
they have lived for more than fifteen centuries. With the aim of stopping ethnic
cleansing of the Serbian people and some other ethnic communities in Kosovo and
Metohija and unfortunately, all this is happening on the eve of the third
millenium after the birth of his Lord, Jesus Christ, and in the presence of
military and civilian forces from the countries which consider themselves
Christian and civilized (KFOR and UNMIK) the Synod has sent its protest to
the United Nations, as well as an appeal to UNESCO, to stop further destruction
and appropriation of Orthodox churches and monasteries in Kosovo and Metohija
and the destruction of the remaining spiritual and cultural treasure, which is
not only Serbian heritage but also the heritage of the European and world
culture.
The Serbian Orthodox
Church is hoping that the present suffering of all people, including our people,
will soon stop thanks to the efforts of all those who carry good will in their
hearts. The Church prays to God of peace and love to give us strength to endure
these sufferings, and when they are finished to create the climate of mutual
understanding and respect for a life in freedom and tolerance. The Serbian
Orthodox Church has always worked towards these spiritual values, and it will go
on fighting and sacrificing for them in future." (Statsmen taken from
Internet site: www.kosovo.com. Official site of the SOC is : www.spc.yu)
80 At some stage, the
chief of UNMIK mission, B. Kuchner announced the preparation of documents on the
protection on the non-Albanian population, with a possibility of civilians from
towns being moved to nearby zones, but this announcement has never been
mentioned since. (Danas,
81 Danas, September 23,
1999. p.1 "Vladika Artemije i Trajkovi} napustili Prelazni savet"
("Bishop Artemije and Trajkovic left the Interim council "), see also
Blic,
82 The list of kidnapped
and killed Serbs in Kosovo by August 30, was published regularly in Danas,
83 See bilingual
Serbian-English publication: Crucified Kosovo. Destroyed and Desecrated Serbian
Orthodox Churches in Kosovo and Metohija (June - August 1999),
84 "Looking for
Albanian They Found Serbian Corpses ", Glas javnosti, August 29, 1999, p.
3.
85 "Amid this anarchy,
the question has to be asked:can the shameful campaign of "ethnic cleansing"
and murder of Serbs that continues under K-For's eyes still be explained away as
revenge attacks, as retaliation for the mass atrocities committed against
Albanians by Serb forces before and during the Kosovo war? A growing number of
Albanian intellectuals,including several courageous journalists on the daily
Koha Ditore newspaper, fear that the murders and dispossession of Serbs are now
being organised." (The Independent, London, November 24, 1999, "Armed
Albanians take revenge with campaign of murder,house-burning and intimidation
that has driven out thousands Serbs murdered by the hundred since 'liberation",
by Robert Fisk in Pristina.)
86 New York Times, August
31, 1998 :"Rebel Terror Forcing Minority Serbs Out of Kosovo ", by
Mike O'Connor; "Kosovo Rebels Make Own Law", by R. Jeffrey Smith,
Washington Post, November 24, 1999, page A1. Thursday, November 18, 1999; "NATO's
reputation a casualty of war", The Toronto Sun, November 18, 1999, by Peter
Worthington< cf. also: "U.N. Discovers Colonialism Isn't Easy in Kosovo",
The Wall Street Journal, New York, November 2, 1999, commentary , by Max Boot.
87. 1 The "Berlin
Wall" in the Balkans of which Rexhep Qosja talked to the author of this
text in 1991 during symposium in Pristina, was pulled down only to create
ethnically pure
http://www.rastko.org.yu/kosovo/istorija/batakovic/batakovic_serbs_of_kosovo.html